

Types of terrorism: from the Red Brigades to Al Qaeda, from the Palestinian Brigade to ISIS

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ABSTRACT

It is necessary to link the phenomenon of terrorism to the concept of information and communication. Information that comes from the exposure that every terrorist organization makes of itself and the communication produced by the media to inform the public about the facts. In the '70s, in Italy, the Red Brigades used the flyers as real ideological treatises, destined to the means of communication. Thirty years after Al Qaeda's jihadi organization, it ushered in the season of new global terrorism; on September 11, 2001, a new type of advertise was born, exploiting television channels and the Web, reaching the rest of society. Nowadays, we are faced with ISIS, which has managed to set up a very articulate and complex recruitment work based on an online propaganda, through the diffusion of photos, audio and video messages on the Internet, succeeding in making proselytes even among Europeans. In this study we want to show how all the terrorist movements are organized and lucidly determined in designing their own actions and messages. The historical context that has given light to the organizations, the internal structure, the ideology, the modus operandi and the media dimension has been deepened; the role of women and children, the enlistment, the new scenarios and the extra European measures of prevention in the fight against terrorism.

RIASSUNTO

È necessario collegare il fenomeno del terrorismo al concetto d'informazione e comunicazione. Informazione che nasce dalla propaganda che ogni organizzazione terroristica fa di sé stessa e dalla comunicazione prodotta dai media per informare l'opinione pubblica sui fatti. Negli anni '70, in Italia, le Brigate Rosse utilizzavano i volantini come veri e propri trattati ideologici, destinati ai mezzi di comunicazione. Trent'anni dopo l'organizzazione jihadista di Al Qaeda, inaugurava la stagione del nuovo terrorismo globale; con l'11 settembre 2001 nacque un nuovo tipo di propaganda che sfruttava i canali televisivi e il web, raggiungendo tutto il resto della società. Ai giorni nostri, ci troviamo di fronte all'ISIS, che è riuscita a mettere in piedi un'opera di reclutamento molto articolata e complessa basata su una propaganda online, attraverso la diffusione in internet di foto, messaggi audio e video, riuscendo a fare proseliti persino fra gli europei. Con questo approfondimento si vuole dimostrare come tutti i movimenti terroristici siano organizzati e lucidamente determinati nel progettare le proprie azioni e i propri messaggi. Si è approfondito il contesto storico che ha dato luce alle organizzazioni, la struttura interna, l'ideologia, il modus operandi e la dimensione mediatica; il ruolo delle donne e dei bambini, l'arruolamento, i nuovi scenari e le misure extraeuropee di prevenzione nella lotta al terrorismo.

RESUMEN

Es necesario vincular el fenómeno del terrorismo con el concepto de información y comunicación. Información que surge de la propaganda que cada organización terrorista hace de sí misma y de la comunicación producida por los medios para informar al público sobre los hechos. En los años 70, en Italia, las Brigadas Rojas utilizaron los volantes como verdaderos tratados ideológicos, destinados a los medios de comunicación. Treinta años después de la organización yihadi de Al Qaeda, se hizo presente en la temporada de nuevo terrorismo global; El 11 de septiembre de 2001, nació un nuevo tipo de propaganda, explotando canales de televisión y la web, llegando al resto de la sociedad. Hoy en día, nos enfrentamos a ISIS, que ha logrado establecer un trabajo de reclutamiento muy articulado y complejo basado en una propaganda en línea, a través de la difusión de fotos, mensajes de audio y video en Internet, logrando hacer prosélitos incluso entre los europeos. En este estudio queremos mostrar cómo todos los movimientos terroristas se organizan y se determinan lucidamente en el diseño de sus propias acciones y mensajes. Se ha profundizado el contexto histórico que ha dado luz a las organizaciones, a la estructura interna, a la ideología, al modus operandi y a la dimensión mediática; el papel de las mujeres y los niños, el alistamiento, los nuevos escenarios y las medidas extra europeas de prevención en la lucha contra el terrorismo.

Introduction

All terrorist organizations differ in their ideology, type of objectives, mode of action and different use of the media, but all have in common the use of violence and above all the search for visibility. Terrorism has always been characterised by the use of violence to spread a specific message, trying in every way to reach as many people as possible, in the hope that they will support their cause or, alternatively, that terror will prevent them from obstruct-

ing them. The main characteristic of the terrorist phenomenon is the instillation of fear, producing real panic aimed at paralyzing an entire society.

Nowadays, in the society of new media and the digital age, it has never been so easy to arouse fear, because news, strongly linked to images, is quick to reach every corner of the Earth. If in Italy, the Red Brigades carried out a type of terrorism more confined to the national level, mainly targeting important political or information personalities, with Al Qaeda there is a new type of terrorism with a more religious and fundamentalist ideology which

has directed its actions, above all, towards objectives situated in enemy territory, aiming at symbolic buildings and involving a very high number of civilians in its massacres, making these attacks its own propaganda.

Between the nationalist terrorism of the Red Brigades and the global and fundamentalist terrorism of Al Qaeda, the action of two European organizations stands as a link: ETA in the Basque Country and the IRA, in Ireland. These two groups were born from independence claims and directed their attacks mainly at the authorities and the media present on their national soil. Both have established an extensive network of links with the main European, Palestinian and South American terrorist movements, thus bringing their terrorist action to a transnational level.

ISIS, has brought back to life in Syria and Iraq, the dream of the Caliphate never realized by Al Qaeda. Its objectives are therefore extremely ambitious, both militarily and strategically and in terms of propaganda. This is the reason why the militants of the Islamic State have replaced a more modern and highly professional propaganda on social networks, addressed directly to the western population.

Italy in the years of lead: Brigades' ideology and the role of women

Years of lead means the Italian historical period from 1969 to 1981, the year in which the liberation of the American general James Lee Dozier sanctioned, in the eyes of public opinion, the definitive defeat of the Red Brigades. The emergence of the terrorist phenomenon in Italy, is relocated by historians with the cultural revolution that has crossed the entire West since 1968. This revolution started with young people and was characterized by a growing distrust of institutions, a rejection of authorities and social norms, a widespread unease in the face of a contradictory reality that was taking on the features of a capitalist and consumer society and where human and social relations were overshadowed, in a reality made even more evident by injustices and inequalities. The prolongation of this situation will reach a breaking point in 1977, the year in which there will be an explosion of political violence with the prolongation of violence and unrest and an opposition between North and South, which in addition to political division, weakened governments and created violent and subversive actions. *"To these factors must be added the single facts that characterized that decade and that, besides triggering the spark, favoured the interest of some institutional forces in maintaining a situation of instability that should have favoured the affirmation of a moderate policy"*. (Galli G., 2007, p. 7).

The phenomenon of protest was born among young people and in particular in the universities, where the students, started the protests occupying the universities, driven both by poor job prospects and by the opposition of the Gui Law that introduced the closed number, thus contradicting the right of all to education. If at first, the movement relied on student organizations linked to the parties, soon they accepted the ideals of operatic theories that were linked to the unrest of the factories. Between 1967 and 1968, the phenomenon spread throughout Italy and worsened until it resulted in violent clashes with law enforcement agencies. *"Of great impact were the facts concerning the occupation of the Catholic University of Milan"* (Lumley R., 1998, pg. 92 -101). Initially, the students created a form of peaceful experimental politics, on a passive resistance line, under the leadership of leader Mario Capanna. But they were not granted any possibility of dialogue and the intervention of the police was immediately invoked. What happened to

the Catholic Church is symptomatic of the upheavals that affected the Church. Many of the leaders of the Red Brigades, including Curcio and Cagol, had a Catholic education and tried to reconcile this cultural background with Marxist doctrine. The result was that the Church itself ended up abandoning itself to the current and entering into a profound crisis, which is why Enzo Peserico defines Sixty-eight as *"a great lost opportunity for Catholics"*. (Peserico E., 2008, p. 155).

On the factory front, the conflict became particularly critical in 1968-1969, as workers in Northern Italy fought for wage increases and safety at work, opposing the bosses and the factory's own institution, resorting to strike, collective bargaining and self-reduction. In the south, because the factories were few and isolated, the episodes of protest remained more limited. *"The real drama was that of the workers who had emigrated to the North, who found themselves fighting not only for their working conditions but also for their status as marginalised excluded people, often clashing with the same emigrants from the South who had embarked on a career in the police force"*. (Lumley R., 1998, p. 184 - 185).

The last months of 1969, what the press called "the hot autumn", saw a peak of tension that gave rise to frequent episodes of violence in the streets and clashes with the police, so as to make the entire social order appear in precarious balance. In addition, there was distortion of the media to arouse the anger of the demonstrators. This very short period ended tragically, under the banner of terrorism, with the massacre of Piazza Fontana in Milan. The hot autumn, however, was also an opportunity for the trade unions to take advantage of the wave of unrest to regain their positions and lead the movement in negotiations with the state and industry. The latter were forced to recognise the authorities of the trade union organisations for a new institutionalisation of the dialogue with the workers.

The journalist and sociologist Sabino Acquaviva, has outlined a development in three phases of the years of lead: *"the first phase is that of the 'disintegration of the dominant values', the second is that of 'ideological aggregation' and finally with the third comes to the 'widespread guerrilla warfare'"* (Acquaviva S., 1979, p. 16 -17). The emergence of Italian terrorism would therefore be due to the upheaval and disorientation of the younger generations in the face of a reality that was undergoing a rapid and radical transformation. Such a transformation would have caused a real loss of values and points of reference: the young and the marginalized found a meeting point in the movements of protest until the revolutionary values became the only possible values to be pursued at any cost and in complete isolation from the rest of society.

For Donatella Della Porta, Professor of Political Science and Sociology at the University, the spread of political violence is to be found in the attitude of the police towards the protest movements, which were characterized by radical and violent action on a broad scale and often above the rules. The roots of the violence that characterized all the '70s are therefore to be found in the first clashes between demonstrators and law enforcement agencies.

The panorama of terrorist action in Italy was dominated by the extreme left groups; before the Red Brigades, there were other organizations such as the XXII October Group, the first Genoese armed group and the partisan action groups of Feltrinelli (GAP). Then there was the NAP (Nuclei Armati Proletari), separated from Lotta Continua and Autop (Autonomia Operaia).

The right-wing action, on the other hand, was individualistic, because the students who were part of it, faced with the protest movements, had to decide whether to support their political opponents or whether to collaborate with the State and the institutions of which they were dissatisfied, so they found themselves increasingly marginalised.

The process that led to a correct evaluation of the Brigades' dangerousness was long and contrasted and within this process, Luca Di Meo, distinguishes three phases:

- "From the Piazza Fontana massacre to the kidnapping of Judge Sossi in 1974: in this phase, the terrorist actions were mostly attributed to right-wing movements, while the phenomenon of the Red Brigades was interpreted with an attitude of superficiality and at times demonized.
- From the kidnapping of Sossi to the murder of the deputy director of La Stampa, Casalegno in 1977: it became increasingly difficult to ignore the actions of the Brigades, which became increasingly violent and began to strike the exponents of the same world of information.
- The Moro case: public opinion had come to full awareness of the danger represented by the Red Brigades, but as far as the world of information was concerned, the influence of politics was still too strong for the problem to be dealt with in a completely "objective" way. (Di Meo L., 2004, p. 72 -73).

In 1970, the Red Brigades themselves presented themselves on the public scene with a leaflet in which they defined themselves as autonomous organizations with the declared objective of engaging in a struggle on an equal footing between the proletarian class and the bourgeois institutional system. The organization had its roots not only in Marxist-Leninist philosophy and in the Chinese communist tradition, but also in the movements of Sixty-eight; its own leaders had also been trained during the turmoil of that period, such as Renato Curcio, director of the political magazine of the University of Trento and leader of the protest of the University. The continuity with the methods of the Sixties was very evident, especially in the early stages of the movement, when the R.B. organization acted in support of those workers' groups, who were still far from being satisfied.

Donatella Della Porta, emphasizes how the Red Brigades established themselves on the scene at Pirelli, in Milan, where workers and students struggled to act more closely, often resulting in episodes of violence. The city of Milan then played a fundamental role, also as a symbol of alienating capitalism. In this city that Margherita Cagol compared to a "fierce monster" (Orsini A., 2009, pg.28), the individual found himself completely alienated and isolated, losing all his points of reference. The R.B. organization then moved on to show a different face than at the beginning, since they no longer limited themselves to a simple reaction towards the State, but aimed to replace it.

Characteristics of the R.B. ideology were the claim to build an alternative justice system based on new concepts of good and evil and a systematic legitimisation of one's actions through the denunciation of social injustice. Society had to be re-educated and led by a group of people who dedicated their whole lives to freeing humanity and leading it towards communism, free from conflicts and slavery, and all this was expressed in a pedagogical and didactic tone both in the *Strategic Resolutions* and in the individual leaflets.

The formal organisation was strategic, rigid and precise and was divided into different departments:

- Logistics Brigade that dealt with the practical organization.
- Mass Brigade which supervised the guerrilla actions and was divided into the Triple Brigade (which regulated relations and communications with the Police, Carabinieri and the Judiciary), the Political Forces Brigade and the Factory Brigade.
- The Columns controlled the different geographical areas and were composed only of regular Brigades to whom the political murders were entrusted; the leaders - columns were part of the superior organs of the national logistical front and of the mass

front. At the top of the hierarchy was the Executive Committee, of which two militants on the logistical front and two on the mass front were members, but the most powerful organism in absolute terms was the Strategic Division.

"Despite its history and its traits, it must be underlined, however, that the R.B. movement shares characteristics which are universally common to all terrorist organizations. In addition to the six fundamental elements of left-wing terrorism: the sovereignty of ideology over theory, the myth of revolution around the corner; democracy as a formal problem, the anthropomorphic vision of capital, contempt for human life and the mystique of violence, there is also an obsession with purity and contempt for society. (From the Church, 1981, pg.51-94).

Of fundamental importance is the role of women within the phenomenon of terrorism, in particular within the Red Brigades. Talking about women and terrorism usually creates discomfort, as the term woman is used to associate words such as welcome, femininity, care, motherhood, peace, cooperation. But all these words are part of the stereotypes that our culture and society wants to shatter when it comes to terrorism. Thanks to various research by Katherine Brown of King's College London, the presence of women in terrorist groups has increased over the years and with it the violence they have committed, but almost never the participation of women in political violence has coincided with a claim that has as its ultimate goal gender equality. The presence of women is certainly an incentive to recruit men. Furthermore, there is a widespread but unconfirmed view that terrorist organizations use women to amplify the propaganda message by making murder more horrific and unnatural precisely because it is committed by a woman. Not only that: using women is certainly convenient to be able to infiltrate them, make them go through the controls made by men, hide weapons or bombs and finally give them the role of spy, certainly all more complicated actions to be assigned to men. (Serafini M., 2016, www.corriere.it/reportages/esteri/2016/donne-terrorismo-isis).

Mara Cagol, wife of Renato Curcio, was certainly one of the main leaders of the Red Brigades. In 1969, he married Renato Curcio, went into hiding and participated in all the actions of the R.B., including the kidnapping of Judge Sossi. In the Red Brigades, since the beginning, there are no differences between man and woman. For the R.B. Doctrine, female participation has no specificity compared to male participation; Mario Moretti, (one of its leaders) said: *"In the R.B., I don't know if women have been more or less than men proposing for the most part) but it is certain that they have not been subordinate to anyone"*. (Serafini M., 2016, www.corriere.it/reportages/esteri/2016/donne-terrorismo-isis).

Many women companions entered the Brigades because they were often disappointed by the feminist movement. An example of this is Susanna Ronconi who, always in hiding in the R.B., baptizes her presence with a bank robbery. Daughter of an official father who later became an official of an American oil company, on June 17, 1974 she took part in the command that in the headquarters of the Msi will kill two militants of that party. Following the event "Susanna la timida" she will say: *"I was in a hurry to take sides, I was a militant and I could not wait to take a stand in the contrasts that characterized those years. The slowness of women's movement seemed to me to be a fundamental vice"*.

Ulrike Meinhof, who played a real political role in the terrorism of those years and who had been a journalist before she went into hiding, was certainly one of them. This is what he wrote in the Raf's programmatic document: *"The protest is when I say that something doesn't suit me. Resistance is when I make sure that what I don't like right now doesn't happen again."* At his side also Gudrun Ensslin, with a different but founding story with the

Meinhof of the Raf and united by the same fate of dying in prison in circumstances never clarified. (Serafini M., 2016, www.corriere.it/reportages/esteri/2016/donne-terrorismo-isis).

Global terrorism: From national to international

After the attack of September 11, 2001, the vision of the globalized world has radically changed and terrorism has become the great enemy of the West, destined to characterize a new phase of history. The main protagonist immediately recognized and held responsible for the attack on the Towers is Al Qaeda, which has appeared on the international scene for many years, as well as having been the author of numerous terrorist attacks in the Middle East. The media hadn't paid attention to him all through the '90s. "However, from the 11th of September, the features of what the international expert on terrorism, Martha Crenshaw, has defined as "New Terrorism" began to be seen in this organization and, in general, in the Islamic matrix groups, which would present important innovations and originality with respect to the national terrorist movements which have marked the European history of the 20th Century" (Ceci G.M., 2013, pg. 209).

These elements can be grasped starting from the same structure that, if in the Red Brigades it was rigidly organized according to a hierarchical and pyramidal scheme, now it would present itself as an organization of a horizontal type, articulated in small groups connected by a weak network rather unstable. Another important difference must then be identified in the ideological matrix which guides its actions: until the appearance of the Islamic fundamentalist groups, the ideologies at the base of the terrorist groups had always been of a political-nationalist type, while now terrorism becomes a religious fact, almost sacred, capable of overcoming every limit. The actions of the fundamentalists are more lethal, they strike at objectives indiscriminately using violence as an end, not as a means and in the name of demands that are no longer negotiable, ending up almost reducing the misdeeds of the communist terrorist movements. Not only that: the attacks of the new terrorists who are born and live in the context of globalization and the new media, would be studied to be not only brutal and catastrophic, but even spectacular precisely to win with every means of information media attention, especially visual. "After September 11, seeking the attention of information will no longer be the concern of terrorists, on the contrary, it will be "the media that will hunt down the messages of terrorists". (Di Meo L., 2004, p. 179).

Jean Baudrillard, French philosopher and sociologist, states that: "the new terrorists not only do not fight on an equal footing, in that they bring into play their own death, but they have also appropriated all the weapons of the dominant power" (Morcellini M., 2003, pg.13).

Their trump card is that of immolation, imbued with a symbolic meaning and a radicalism never seen before. Alongside these innovations, elements of continuity between old and new terrorists are identified: also in the organized groups, such as that of the R.B., there were fringes which acted independently at the local level. Moreover, even the conception that the political movements would have selected their victims more accurately was not entirely true as many civilians were involved in the Italian massacres during the years of lead. There are also similarities linked to the environment of origin of the terrorists. Old and new, they always come from a context characterized by extremism and poverty marked by an anti-capitalist and anti-American ideology and by sudden and radical transformations both nationally and internationally. All these similarities can prove to be a valuable tool for today's governments in tackling the terrorist phenomenon. If nationalist groups have been defeated in Italy, Spain and Ireland and throughout Europe, it means that there are precedents from which to draw

inspiration for the most effective way of combating terrorism. Finally, it is significant that this type of terrorism has become established at the same time as the decline of two major national movements: the Basque movement of ETA and the North-Irish movement of the IRA. These two movements have represented, albeit with their differences, some common characteristics, such as the ethno-nationalist ideology and the creation of international networks of collaboration with other terrorist movements. If, therefore, it is true that the Basque and North-Irish movements acted mostly within their own borders and guided by a nationalistic and patriotic ideology, it is also true that they achieved great success in creating transnational and intercontinental connections with other local terrorist organizations. For these reasons, in the history of the IRA and ETA, it is possible to identify the link that has carried the terrorist phenomenon from a national to a global dimension.

Both terrorist movements, to date, have been defeated and eclipsed, but have nevertheless left their mark on the international scene because they presented many aspects in common, starting from the same nationalist and independent ideology and ending with the difficult relationship with the media. ETA leaders have always seen the Irish experience as a kind of mirror, just as the Spanish authorities looked to the work of the British Government to establish the line to take in the fight against terrorism, often underestimating the importance of the many compromises to which the British authorities had to give in the name of peace. In 1971, IRA and ETA, signed with the Liberation Front of Brittany, a unified communiqué coinciding with the celebration of May 1 and a year later declared themselves united against the common European market. There is also evidence of links between the IRA and ETA and the German left-wing movements, the Red Brigades and South American, Lebanese and Yemeni groups.

Another operation carried out at the international level by the nationalist groups was the constant search for external legitimacy. Both IRA and ETA never failed to denounce to the foreign authorities the injustices that their people were forced to suffer, as well as the serious abuses inflicted by the police in prisons.

Although Al Qaeda still has many grey areas, it has redesigned the practice of international relations.

The main characteristics and peculiarities of this movement are to be found in the religious and fundamentalist ideology which has to deal with three major problems:

- The governments of the apostate Muslim states, brought closer to the Western states.
- The Western Crusader enemies.
- The secularization of governments. (Armborst A., 2013, p. 82).

The jihadists therefore have the sensation of being compressed and threatened by an aggressive advance of the Western powers, not only from the military point of view, but also from the political and economic one. Other aspects of the jihadist ideology can be traced back to the same name of the Al Qaeda organization, since it has a double meaning: the first meaning, concerns the connection established between the terrorist group and the information network. It is in fact evident that the actions of Al Qaeda aim at spectacularity and suspense effect. The second refers to the Jihadist desire to recover the declining divine law, a decline that Bin Laden saw in the government of his country, Arabia. Hence, the insistence on belonging to Islam rather than to a nation, and the practice of recruiting followers without distinction of origin, as well as messianic indoctrination.

However, Bin Laden never appealed to a unitary and monolithic dogma or to the excommunication (Takfir) of worldly behavior, pointing out that the good Muslim is not only the one who leads the fight after responding without hesitation to the divine call, but also the one who merely does his part. This philosophy helped the

founder of Al Qaeda to legitimize himself as representative of the entire Islamic world, exploiting a soft ideology, capable of assimilating more currents and attracting more proselytes to himself. There is no doubt about the extremism with which militants adhered to the cause of Jihad, often sacrificing their own lives in the name of common goals. The radicality of the mujaheddin's warrior spirit is then corresponding to an equally radical hatred of the enemy. In their struggle in the name of God, the jihadists are called to annihilate and eliminate aiming to inflict very high human losses. To understand the role of women in extremist movements, we need to take a step back and analyze the female presence in the IRA, where initially since 1914, women have a separate brigade and deal with support and not direct actions. Many years later, after the establishment of the IRA Provisional, women began to enlist like men and to deal with hitting economic targets, while men were relegated to military activities, this because it was easier for women to place explosive devices without being noticed.

With the use of suicide bombers, the instrumental mechanism of the female presence in terrorist groups is taken to the extreme. The use of women as kamikaze is present and strong in the jihadist organizations affiliated to ISIS, which use girls and girls to hit civilian targets, but also women from Western countries have been enlisted to perpetrate suicide attacks in the Middle East, as the Belgian Muriel Degauque. According to a study at the Duke University School of Law, women who voluntarily join a terrorist group are driven by the same goal as men, namely the desire to fight alleged injustices. Even today, a very large number of women have been recruited in ISIS, which in turn has taken a great deal of effort to attract more young people. What is not clear, however, is the role that women play within the group led by Al Baghdadi; that is, whether, as in Al Qaeda and other jihadist groups in general, they are used for logistical and support tasks or whether they are also employed in the front line. "Understanding how women are placed in terrorist organizations is fundamental for those who aim to defeat them" (Serafini M., 2016, <https://www.corriere.it/reportages/esteri/2016/donne-terrorismo-isis/>). It is also clear that the presence of women in extremist groups can be a good key to trigger processes of radicalization and counter propaganda. ISIS included.

Useful, if not indispensable, for the purposes of this research is certainly to deal with the Palestinian Question, to deepen not only the theme of Islamic terrorism, but also to understand the role it plays today and on our national soil.

Palestine is made up of the West Bank and Gaza, two non-independent territories, whose inhabitants are mainly Arabic and Muslim. Officially, there has never been a recognized border with Israel, the Jewish state located in the Middle East; therefore, the governments of the United States, Germany and the United Kingdom, consider it a set of territories under Israeli occupation. The motivation for the conflict between Israel and Palestine, therefore, is not, as many believe, of a religious nature but, first and foremost, concerns the right of those who must administer the territories, and which of them must be assigned and to whom. This attempt at management between Israelis and Palestinians has created another: on the one hand the military occupation, on the other the terrorist action of certain armed groups, which in turn favors the emergence of extremist factions that reject any compromise and aim to destroy the other. Officially, Tel Aviv withdrew troops and settlers from the Gaza Strip in 2005, but maintains a total embargo on the territory that has transformed it into a sort of open-air prison where no one enters and no one leaves. The question of about 500,000 Israeli settlers living in the West Bank, makes the life of the Palestinians even more complicated since Tel Aviv has increased security measures. In the future, even with a possible peace agreement, Israel could claim the areas inhabited by set-

tlers. Hamas' dedication to terrorism and Israel's dedication to destruction imprison Gaza in a conflict that affects Palestinian civilians in the first place, not only in terms of deaths but also in terms of extreme living conditions. The situation is different in the West Bank, where Palestinian leaders are more inclined to negotiate and compromise. However, this policy has led to a state of continuous employment.

Three Palestinian movements can be recognized:

- Al Fatah, founded in 1956 by Yasser Arafat and recognized in 1993 with the Oslo Accords as the governing party in the Palestinian territories, is the main organization of the PLO and in 1993, Arafat signs an agreement with Israel to renounce terrorism and violence.
- Hamas, founded in 1987, has always opposed the peace process and negotiations with Israel, proposing the destruction of the Jewish State and the foundation of an Islamic State, taking total control of the area with the expulsion in 2007 of Al Fatah from the Gaza Strip.
- Jihad Islamic, a radical movement founded in the early eighties in the Gaza Strip, which maintains strong ties with Iran and the Lebanese guerrillas Hezbollah, whose objective is to expel the Zionist occupiers and create in Palestine an Islamic State.

Ending the conflict and pursuing a peaceful path, creating a Palestinian and an Israeli state, would be difficult to pursue because of the tensions that characterize it, making a possible meeting point extremely complicated. The solution of the State, foresees the cancellation of the internal borders and the creation of a pluralist Country in which Israelis and Palestinians live together. A very complicated hypothesis, especially for a demographic discourse because the Arab population would be far superior to the Jewish one and would do anything to affirm its identity. The Israelis would never accept to be outnumbered and lose what they had achieved. Alternatively, the solution most supported by the most extremist fringes would be to destroy one of the parties involved.

Getting to peace is extremely difficult because of four main factors:

- First of all Jerusalem: both sides consider the city their capital and the very disposition of the sacred, Jewish and Muslim places make that the division of the city would displease both Israelis and Palestinians.
- The borders of the West Bank do not have a precise agreement.
- There are about 7 million refugees and despite Palestine's demands for them to return to their homeland in present-day Israel, Tel Aviv is opposed because if this were to happen, the Jewish population would be in a clear minority.
- Palestine is calling for the establishment of a sovereign state, while Israel fears that an independent Palestine could become a hostile country and ally itself with its Arab neighbours in the Middle East. Tel Aviv is also concerned about the power that Hamas could gain in the West Bank, in the wake of what has been done in Gaza. (Fisher M., 2014, <https://www.lettera43.it/it/articoli/cronaca/2014/07/27/israele-palestina-la-guerra-in-ottopunti/122548/>).

On national soil, 1985 was a terrible year in the activity of international terrorism against our country. In September, the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims attacked the offices of British Airways. The U.S. government blamed the Libyan leader Gaddafi for the resurgence of terrorism, decreed sanctions against Libya and placed an embargo on all goods bound for that country. American President Ronald Reagan called on the European countries to take the same measures. Gaddafi reacted by stating that there was no evidence of Libyan responsibility, that the charges were unfounded: he threatened the United

States with retaliation, and he also warned his European allies. Craxi, confirming the line of absolute independence of the Italian government, met the Egyptian President Mubarak in Cairo, inviting him to act as mediator between Italy and Libya. The United States mobilized the VI Mediterranean fleet but NATO did not participate in those operations. In the following years, Italy confirmed a policy of collaboration with Gaddafi's Libya, which intensified further at the beginning of the 21st century, when Gaddafi openly condemned the attack on the Twin Towers, distancing himself from Al Qaeda.

In October, a terrorist commando from the Palestine Liberation Front seized the cruise ship Achille Lauro off the Egyptian coast. Craxi, however, refused to hand over to the United States the hijackers who were transferred to the Syracuse prison, on charges of voluntary murder, kidnapping and hostage-taking. The U.S., which had asked for the hijackers to be tried, protested hard with the Italian government. There was a very hard diplomatic arm wrestling. Craxi was much criticized by the opposition, and his firm attitude also provoked the resignation of the Minister of Defense Giovanni Spadolini (who withdrew them a few days later), but in the end his line of independence of Italy from any foreign interference proved successful. Reagan surrendered to the determination of the Italian government and the crisis was overcome. Subsequently, Abu Abbas was found guilty as the instigator of the kidnapping and sentenced to life imprisonment by the Court of Genoa.

Also in the same year, on December 27, Fiumicino airport was the scene of a bloody terrorist attack. A group of Palestinians from the extremist faction of Abu Nidal attacked the desks of the Israeli airline El Al and the American airline Twa. (Malatesta, 2014, <http://www.carabinieri.it/editoria/il-carabiniere/la-rivista/anno-2014/2014Giugno/dalle-brigate-rosse-al-terrorismo-palestinese>).

Isis: New scenarios

If the main protagonist on the scene of international terrorism in the first years of 2000 was Al Qaeda, in recent years, a new, more feared and radical organization is affirmed: the ISIS. The Islamic State certainly has its roots in the Al Qaeda group, distancing itself from it and developing a new and frightening jihadist experiment. The founder of the original ISIS is Abu Musab Al Zarqawi who, during the Iraqi conflict, had attracted many followers and resources and had put the American forces in serious difficulty with an action that struck above all the Shiites and relied on kamikaze attacks. Bin Laden's main objective was to create an international front that would repel the invasion of Western militias and free Muslims from apostate governments. Al Zarqawi, who led the wing of Iraqi Al Qaeda, had begun to postulate a different strategy, which would exploit precisely the division of this Country between a Shiite majority and a Sunni minority, which, with Saddam Hussein, held power. Al Zarqawi aimed to create an exclusively Sunni Islamic caliphate and to do this it was necessary to neutralize any type of governmental authority and build a single large state dominated by Islamic forces.

After the killing of Al Zarqawi, his successor Abu Omar Al Baghdadi, causes a setback to the movement. In 2010 Abu Omar also died and Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, the Muslim Caliph, took over the role of new leader of the AQI. Abu Bakr, who claimed a direct descent from Mohammed, was with Al Zarqawi and the Taliban of Kabul from 1996, and his academic background, which legitimized a personal interpretation of Islam, was a fundamental factor in his success. On June 29, 2014, on the first day of Ramadan, Al Baghdadi

announces the birth of a new Caliphate, with the capital Raqqa, which takes the name of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) which will later become known simply as the Islamic State. The borders of the new Caliphate today include most of the territories of Syria and Iraq; its banner, a black flag with a white inscription that reads "There is no divinity outside of God. Mohammed is the messenger of God", now represents a larger territory of Texas. In this new caliphate, the militants of ISIS have therefore created a radical and modern form of theocracy based on a rigorous interpretation of the Muslim religion, obtaining wide support especially from the younger generations, while often the Imams and the elderly have not recognized the authority, without explicitly contesting it. (The ISIS explained by the experts. The origins of the Holy War, www.tgcom24.mediaset.it/mondo/2014/notizia/l-isis-spiegato-dagli-espertile-origini-della-guerra-santa_2066572.shtml) "The caliphate is an institutional reality even if for the moment it remains an entity that has the socio-economic infrastructure but lacks the political recognition and popular consensus of a real state. (Napoleoni L., 2015, p. 36). ISIS in Iraq can count on thousands of men to which is added the support of numerous Sunni tribes and the alliance of Baathist groups, supporters of the socialist party Baath, born in Syria and supporter of the creation of a single great Arab Nation. These alliances also remain strong, thanks to the constant climate of total opposition in Iraq, to which the very brutality of ISIS contributes. The Islamic State has also succeeded in quickly accumulating enormous wealth, especially after the conquest of Mosul in Iraq. The main revenues come from the oil business, from the depredations that accompanied the conquest campaigns, from money laundering, to the ransom of hostages and from probable financing from the Sunnis of Arabia, Kuwait and other States, as well as from activities that are not yet completely clear.

The objective of ISIS would seem to be to found a real State even if "not recognizing the international community, it does not need to build a state to legitimize itself to it, much less as regards its Middle Eastern emanation, which is exactly what it stands against", as Vittorio Emanuele Parsi, director of the High School of Economics and International Relations of the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart of Milan, points out.

Although the objective remains always the Jihad, there are numerous and important differences between Al Qaeda and ISIS:

- The first is that, contrary to ISIS, Al Qaeda has never been able to impose a real political control on a territory, limiting itself to cover, with its groups, more or less vast areas, but always in a clandestine manner. The Islamic State, on the other hand, presents itself with real institutions as a body endowed with its own authority and laws. One of these institutions is that of a real Islamic army, much more similar both in the organization and in the action to regular state troops rather than to the guerrilla and terrorist groups acting for Al Qaeda.
- The second difference between these two organizations is the different fields of action on which they are focused. In fact, it can be noted that Al Qaeda has directed its attacks exclusively on objectives which are in enemy territory, or at most, against the apostate governments, taking care not to unleash conflicts within the Moslem world and, on the contrary, postponing the constitution of a caliphate so that this could be born under the banner of Islamic unity. The energies of ISIS, on the other hand, have focused first of all on the affirmation of its power in the Arab territory and on the expansion of the borders, an objective which has been reached at the expense of the Shiite Moslems and with the systematic use of force.

ISIS and Al Qaeda are, therefore, configured as two groups in effective competition with each other, and it can be affirmed, therefore, that ISIS is increasingly moving away from the classical

model of terrorist organization to take the form of what by now appears to be a governmental body to all intents and purposes. ISIS is in fact a rigorous and well-structured organization that leaves nothing to chance, making it dangerously effective in military terms and in controlling the population.

The CNN has traced a map of the hierarchy which governs the Islamic State thanks to the Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium (Belardelli, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.it/2014/09/19/anatomia-delcaliffato_n_5849140.html), which has noted how the organization presents itself with a pyramidal structure, where the summit is represented by the leader Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi and by a limited number of collaborators. Under them there are two deputies in charge of the management of Syria and Iraq. Direct control over the territory is entrusted to twenty-four governors, twelve in Iraq and twelve in Syria, responsible for twenty-four sub-regions in which government institutions are represented by local committees. A council called Shura oversees this executive branch and ensures that its work remains in accordance with Sharia law. The evolution with respect to the organization of Al Qaeda is evident.

The popular consensus is indispensable for the Caliphate, which wants to present itself in all respects as a sort of Islamic Israel or a promised land for all Muslims. In this context, violence is only a means, but one that remains widely used.

An interesting reason to study the life of the Islamic State is the documentary made by the reporter Medyan Dairieh for Vice News. The documentary on the Islamic State shot by the Western journalist was made during the three weeks of stay in the city of Raqqa in Dairieh and is divided into five parts:

- The spread of the Caliphate.
- Recruitment of children in Jihad.
- The strengthening of the Sharia.
- The treatment of the remaining Christians in the city.
- The situation on the border between Syria and Iraq.

From this document it clearly emerges all the pervasive force of the Jihadist rulers and their infiltrated ideology not only in the laws and in education but also in the same way of living the Muslim faith. Men and children are gathered in prayer centers to deepen their knowledge of religion and especially to celebrate the jihadist ideology and the use of violence against America and the West.

The rigour of how ISIS manages the new Islamic state can be seen, however, not only in the absolute religious observance imposed on all its inhabitants, but also in the application of the Koranic laws, in the punishment of all types of misdeeds, from arrest to flogging for those who drink alcohol; from the amputation of hands for those who steal, to the death penalty for those who kill; from the total obedience of women, always accompanied by a man, to the use of a veil that covers the entire body and face, made with material often to hide even the clothes worn under it. The executions take place in public through crucifixions or beheading with the head exposed on spades. The most worrying aspect is that the population tends to get used to it quickly; not only does the violence of ISIS no longer disturb a large part of the Muslims, but it receives more and more support from the children, the most unsuspected part of the population, who are in fact recruited at an early age and subjected to a sort of indoctrination. An article in Foreign Policy, stresses “how the young fighters of the Islamic State could represent a long-term threat, since they are kept away from normal schools and instilled with strict Islamist propaganda”. The consequence of this strict jihadist education is that in the end the children of ISIS dream of being able to sacrifice themselves for the Islamic State. In addition to real training camps, where children and young people are pushed by their parents, trained in the use of weapons and violence, they are very often exploited in battle for the blood transfusions necessary for jihadist soldiers and trained in view of

future suicide bombings. Of course, the recruitment of young and very young people to ISIS is not only a violation of human rights and children’s rights, but also a serious danger for the future. The jihadists focus on children not only because they consider them easy to manage and manipulate but also because they aim to build an empire that lasts over time and that does not end in a single generation. Moreover, the children of today will become even more violent and radical Jihad fighters in the future and will in turn form new generations of fundamentalists who are increasingly unscrupulous. The ISIS problem is anything but a passenger problem, apart from the fact that many other unsuspected allies are also Muslims with European passports.

In fact, many young people have long been resident in the main European capitals, educated with the knowledge of English, modern technologies and social networks that have embraced with enthusiasm the jihadist cause. Most of them come from England where Syria is easily accessible and are generally second or third generation immigrants but are sometimes also veterans of the Second Gulf War. These young people often find themselves without a job and without particular expectations and as a result are attracted by an easy and accessible career in the Jihad. The jihadist movement of ISIS seems, therefore, to welcome the demands not only of the Islamic fundamentalists who had already been followers of Al Qaeda, but also of a generation that does not feel integrated into the new globalized world and that needs to find a group to which it belongs and a cause to fight for.

Behind the enormous success of the organization there is a modern propaganda. Anyone can easily find on the web the numerous videos of the jihadists, full of threats and contempt for the American and Western culture. The images, besides showing executions and battles or spreading the messages to the world, publicize the grandeur of the Islamic State with the most modern cinematographic techniques, facing the contrast between the absolute modernity of the media and the medieval barbarity that constitutes its content. Here, then, is the strength of the Islamic State: the ability to sacrifice human beings without any kind of problem, the spectacularization of violence, the loss of all respect for life: these are the weapons that ISIS has discovered to be more efficient in hitting the heart of the West, having a demonstration of their strength since the first kamikaze attacks of Al Qaeda. In the messages of ISIS, however, there is not only violence, often there are accurate and in-depth analyses of a religious and theological nature. To this dualism corresponds a double linguistic level in which appears both the language belonging to the Koranic tradition but also a type of emotional language that aims to fuel the utopian dream of the Caliphate and to arouse a sense of guilt in all Muslims who do not participate in this project. Even the production of propaganda videos is entrusted to real professionals and there are many production companies in charge of making and distributing the films. Al Hayat is certainly the best known also because its origins are not Middle Eastern but German.

Al Hayat’s videos are intended exclusively for Western audiences and would seem to have been made specifically for this type of audience and it is no coincidence that these videos, as well as being translated into English, French and German, have a style similar to that of Hollywood and launched on the web at a time suitable for European audiences. The jihadist propaganda, therefore, does not only look at itself but also at the public to which it is destined, adapting from time to time to its needs to obtain the greatest possible impact. It is clear the reference to the U.S. film universe and the level of professionalism and spectacularity with which the videos are made even if the jihadist presence is expressed not only in the dissemination of propaganda videos but also on social networks where the accounts of ISIS despite all the

efforts made by the authorities in an attempt to close them reproduce at the speed of light. ISIS terrorists use all popular channels to spread their messages and their videos are easily available everywhere. Communication therefore seems to be a focal point of the jihadist strategy that spreads virally on the web and shows a very high level of knowledge of all the latest media, so as to suggest that there are real social managers inside. However, ISIS does not neglect the printed press either, as demonstrated by the existence of the magazine *Daquib*, a magazine which is also translated into English and which reports not only all the main facts relating to the jihad, but also ideological considerations, including all the crimes of which America is guilty against the jihadists. A New York Times article noted that ISIS propaganda does not focus so much on the threats of its enemies as on the spread of its ideology and objectives. Much of the ISIS energy is therefore used to celebrate its success and convert more and more groups to its cause, and to do so, this organization advertises itself not only through words and images but also with real gadgets. It is therefore quite clear that ISIS' self-promotion operations have been as successful as they should have been.

In a scenario in which ISIS seemed to be the only protagonist of international terrorism, on January 7, 2015, it reminded us that Al Qaeda is still extremely dangerous and continues its strategy of attacking the West. The massacre perpetrated in the editorial staff of the magazine *Charlie Hebdo* is confirmation that in the war on America and Europe, even the propaganda of Al Qaeda still manages to make proselytes. The responsible people, two Franc-Algerian brothers in their thirties named Said and Chérif Kouachi, helped by a third person, initially managed to escape. On January 8th, the third bomber, Amedy Coulibaly killed a policewoman in a shooting in Montrouge and then fled and claimed the attack in a video in which his partner Hayat Boumedienne also appeared when he joined ISIS. On 9 January, Coulibaly, a French citizen of Malaysian origin, then raided a supermarket in Porte de Vincennes, taking a dozen people hostage but was killed during a police raid in which four hostages lost their lives. Coulibaly said he agreed with the Kouachi brothers with whom he would synchronize; with Chérif, in fact, they had contacts in prison in 2008. But while Coulibaly declared himself affiliated to the ISIS organization, the attack by the Kouachi brothers turned out to be dependent on the organization of Al Qaeda and in particular on AQAP, the wing of Al Qaeda of the Arab peninsula, born in 2009 from the fusion of the Yemeni and Saudi fronts. The AQAP in fact released a video where it claimed the attack to be understood as a revenge to redeem the offended honor of the prophet Mohammed and in which it threatened new attacks in case the satire against the Muslims was continued and how the Kouachi brothers were hired. The film provides another piece of information: the attack was carried out following the orders of the supreme leader of Al Qaeda, Ayman Al Zawahiri or Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, who chose the objective and financed the operation. AQAP's claim videos therefore seem to confirm the investigation hypothesis that the Kouachi brothers were in Yemen in 2011 and that they were training together with the jihadists. This joint participation of Al Qaeda and ISIS, however, should not be interpreted as a collaboration between the two organizations that remain two separate entities and in competition, but rather as the result of the friendship that united the three attackers (Zacchetti, 2015, <http://www.ilpost.it/2015/01/15al-qaida-yemen/>).

Franco Cardini, historian and essayist of the *Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno*, underlines the need to make the necessary differences between ISIS and Al Qaeda, remembering that they are competing forces; "if one is attacked, one does the other a favor". (Petrocelli, 2015, <http://www.barbadillo.it/34453-lintervista-cardini-lislam-charlie-hebdo-e-il-conflitto-tra-isis-e-alqaeda>). Further confirmation

comes from journalist Daniele Ranieri, who claims that the Paris bombers have not taken into account the rift in the Middle East since 2013, because they knew each other since before (Ranieri, 2015, <http://www.ilfoglio.it/articoli/v/124526/rubriche/al-qaeda-isis-rivali-o-no.html>).

While Isis and Al Qaeda are therefore divided, public opinion has instead shown itself to be united around the French mourning and the condemnation of terrorism. The Islamic world has also sent out demonstrations of support which have condemned an act of terrorism in which it is not recognised and which could harm the entire French Muslim community, since the majority of them do not share the practices and acts of violence of which ISIS and Al Qaeda are capable.

Since the *Charlie Hebdo* massacre, numerous other attacks have taken place in the main European capitals. *Rumiyah*, a jihadist magazine translated into seven languages that circulates not only in the Middle East, but also and above all in Europe, aims to make new followers and trigger a new wave of attacks. To do so, the magazine is aimed directly at second and third generation European citizens. A real terrorist vademecum. (www.affaritaliani.it/cronache/isis-camion-strategie-obiettivi-da-colpire-ecco-il-vademecum-del-terrorista-456240/).

Extra-European measures to prevent the fight against terrorism

The phenomenon of terrorism, precisely because it is not limited to Europe but extends to the world, must be studied in detail both by the coordination of European actions with initiatives developed at world level. This is an essential condition if we really want to adopt a strategy that is truly effective in combating this phenomenon.

On 21 December 1998, the Council of the European Union had already issued an invitation to all Member States to cooperate against the most serious forms of organized crime, including terrorism. Particular attention must be paid to prevention and exchange of information, as well as consistent prosecution and prompt punishment of perpetrators, with specific provision for numerous improvements in the area of police cooperation and jurisdiction.

For preventive purposes, the strengthening of civil aviation security standards, with the protection of goods and passengers carried, is required for the essential right to freedom of movement.

One of the security standards is that all airports are equipped with the latest technology to ensure that passengers and luggage are properly screened. The technical possibilities for detection of explosives will also need to be improved, taking into account the rapid development of technology in this area. Particular attention is paid to the prohibition of the misuse of data and telecommunications networks for terrorist purposes, so that each Member State should create mechanisms to prevent the placing on the Internet of instructions for the construction of explosives and provisions to prevent unauthorised access to civil and/or military databases. Emphasis must be placed on the training and specialisation of permanent experts in the field of explosives, as well as in the psychological, social, biological and chemical fields. Particular attention should be paid to controlling the development, production, trade, transport, import and export of arms.

Another measure suggested for the purposes of prevention is certainly that in the appeal to all Member States to reduce political, ethnic, social conflicts, which are agitated within them by promoting democratic dialogue, and integration to eliminate social, economic and cultural marginalization as well as provide the authori-

ties responsible for criminal proceedings or public security all the technical possibilities useful for the purposes of investigation and the preparation of technical premises for the control of telephone equipment.

Conclusions

At the end of this research, some fundamental characteristics of the terrorist propaganda emerged clearly, each one developed in its own way by each group.

The most important is the dual function of terrorist communication, as terrorists communicate both to produce and fuel terror and to make proselytes. This dualism, however, is not present in the messages equally in all organizations. The messages of the Red Brigades were extremely technical and aggressive and were therefore not easily accessible by most Italians. The Brigades' flyers were not broadcast on television because as many people as possible would not catch anything other than the threats and promises of destruction. For Al Qaeda, Bin Laden's organization must be recognized as an important innovation for having been able to create for his militants the mirage of a reward that goes beyond death, but the attempt to convert new militants to their cause can be considered failed, as their propaganda consists mainly of videos of claims rich in religious sermons and spectacular attacks full of symbolic value, or a type of communication too extreme and aggressive to be able to make an effective grip. With ISIS we are witnessing the birth of a new era of terrorist propaganda that is proving extremely problematic and dangerous. ISIS has in fact understood much more than its predecessors the importance of the search for consensus; for this reason, the messages tend to focus little on the threats to the enemy, devoting ample space to self-celebration and the creation of a positive myth of the Islamic State.

Another fundamental characteristic of every terrorist group is that it is founded on a solid and well-defined ideology. In this respect, the differences between the organisations examined are numerous and extremely significant. The ideology of the Red Brigades was a communist and marxist ideology that was part of the phenomenon of the cultural revolution of sixty-eight. The enemy was the institutions and the main objective was therefore to overthrow and upset them in view of the advent of the communist utopia. To guide the Brigades there was therefore an unlikely hope that a new Era would be at the gates. The R.B. militant felt as if he were on a mission to bring about a change in society and the prize for the one who chose to lead this revolution was the new status of "elected and hero". This type of ideology has also characterized the movements of ETA and IRA, while the vision of Al Qaeda was completely different, where the engine of the militant actions is placed in an otherworldly dimension and the compensation prepared in the afterlife exceeds the sacrifice of one's own life. In this case, reflection and concreteness are totally overshadowed and any possibility of mediation and compromise is put aside. Equally neglected is the component of the long-term organization sacrificed in the name of extreme action, direct and immediate much more destructive than constructive. Probably, precisely this weakness has given rise to the emergence of ISIS, whose principal objective has always been the creation of the Caliphate, a project which Al Qaeda has never really tried to implement; ISIS has transformed a utopia into reality, bringing terrorist action and its objectives back to the present and to the concrete, creating a positive message for its proselytes, an effective conquest in which everyone can participate and from which they can take immediate advantage. It is not surprising that this ideology has been so successful everywhere. It

has also been seen that there is an almost symbiotic relationship between the media and terrorism. Terrorist organisations do not just exploit the attention of the media, they also seek it with every possible means.

Terrorists have shown a determination to recall the world of information and ability to prevent attempts by the authorities to obscure it. While the press releases of the Brigades which were insisted upon being sent to the editorial offices of the newspapers could be censored relatively easily, controlling the dissemination of ISIS messages now seems almost impossible because the terror industry immediately seized all the new possibilities offered by modern technologies and effectively participated in the process of democratization of information. It is therefore possible to notice an evolution that has produced a real exchange of parts. If before it was the media that decided what constituted information and what had to be kept quiet, forcing the terrorists to adapt, today it is the opposite. In Italy in the 70's the most widely used medium was undoubtedly that of the press and the communications of the R.B. were based on the written word. The attack alone was therefore not sufficient to fully express the sense of the R.B. action and it was therefore necessary that this be exposed and explained in the leaflets, which were in fact the true core of the propaganda of this organization. Al Qaeda, exploiting Al Jazeera, used the attacks as propaganda messages, while Bin Laden's videos acted as a means for the claims.

The attacks became a real spectacle designed to reap as many victims as possible and to reach all corners of the globe. If for the R.B. the means of communication is the press, for Al Qaeda the TV, that of ISIS is the web. ISIS, still focused on the construction of the Caliphate, has found in the network, a communication channel as effective as it is easy and immediate to use. The point of arrival of the terrorist propaganda has passed from the centrality of the word to that of the image and from that of the image to the cinematographic narration with the result of a propaganda always more direct and professional and therefore more difficult to contrast.

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