CONSTRUING THE REASONABLE. RAWLS"S POLITICAL LIBERALISM BETWEEN RORTY AND HABERMAS

The article investigates the concept of "reasonable", which can be defined as the keystone of John Rawls' political liberalism, by explaining the opposite possible interpretations in order to obtain a more general clarification on the philosophical project of late Rawls. The first section, after a schematic presentation of Rawls' political liberalism, offers an analytical discussion of the notions of "reasonable" and "rational" at the domestic level. The second section makes explicit the fundamental ambiguity contained in the concept of "reasonable", using in a paradigmatic way the opposite readings proposed by Richard Rorty and Jürgen Habermas (respectively, a contextualist-pragmatist and a Kantiano- universalist reading). Finally, the third section examines the development of the concept of "reasonable" at the international level, showing how the ambiguity inherent in this concept leads to tensions not adequately resolved by Rawls. At the same time, while highlighting the tensions paradigmatically represented by the opposite readings of Rorty and Habermas, the article concludes that the late Rawls project cannot be reduced to any of these opposite readings, and deserves to be developed in its peculiarity, starting from a reformulation of the concept of "reasonable".